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Introduction
Easy monetary conditions are a classic ingredient of financial crisis (Borio and Zhu, 2008; Gambacorta, 2009) . It is therefore not surprising that, recent studies have examined how monetary policy may contribute to an excessive expansion of credit and consequently banks' risk-taking behaviour. Expansionary monetary policy strengthens banks' net-worth, induces banks to increase leverage by expanding assets aggressively and banks' risk-taking, pointing to a different dimension of the monetary transmission mechanism, the so-called risk-taking channel (Borio and Zhu, 2008; Adrian and Shin, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010) . Conversely, the extant literature on risk-taking channel largely supports the contention that tightening monetary policy tends to reduce banks' risk-taking incentive (Jimenez et al., 2009; Ioannidou et al., 2009; Altunbas et al., 2010; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011) . It is pertinent to note that while these studies have been in the context of both advanced market and emerging economies, the results have been mixed (see Delis and Brissimis, 2010; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Michalak, 2012; De Graeve et al., 2008; Buch et al., 2011) . Moreover, prior studies have virtually not examined the topic in an emerging market economy such as China where the presence of large involuntary excess reserves 1 in the banking system is large. The aggregate excess reserves beyond statutory requirements in Chinese banking system stood at an average of 10% of deposit base in the 1990s and the early 2000s (Anderson, 2009; Laurens and Maino, 2009) , although the ratio gradually fell to 3.3% in 2012 2 , yet it is judged to be high compared to banks in the US and Euro-zone countries and higher than precautionary level (Wei et al., 2008; Anderson, 2009; Ma et al., 2011) . The large involuntary excess reserves in the Chinese banking system have raised some concerns regarding the forming of price bubble which may result in financial 2 crisis (Zhang and Pang, 2008; Zhang, 2009; Yang, 2010; Huang et al., 2010; Guo and Li, 2011) . The presence of involuntary excess reserves indicates unwanted surplus liquidity (Agenor et al., 2004) . It is argued that the low probability of illiquidity risk induces bank managers to relax credit lending standards and lend out more aggressively to increase managerial compensation which is often tied to credit volume and exacerbate agency problem (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) . While bank managers may be remunerated inversely to the risk they take, Acharya and Naqvi (2012) argue that the surplus liquidity environment makes the risk-taking behaviour easier to conceal. Yet, we know very little regarding the effectiveness of tightening monetary policy on risk-taking behaviour in a situation such as China where large involuntary excess reserves is present in the banking system. To fill this gap, we investigate the linkage between involuntary excess reserves, monetary policy and risk-taking bahaviour of banks in China.
In this paper, we examine the impact of monetary policy on the risk-taking behaviour of
Chinese banks in the presence of involuntary excess reserves. The paper contributes to literature in two important ways: First, we clarify the impact of involuntary excess reserves on risk-taking behaviour of banks in an emerging market economy which has become more interconnected with the world economy and likely to play a more crucial role in future global financial crisis. Second, the study sheds lights on the effectiveness of government monetary policy in reducing the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context where involuntary excess reserves are present. The study therefore extends the risk-taking channel theory in the context where large involuntary excess reserves are present in the banking market. We find that involuntary excess reserves appear to lead to more aggressive risk-taking in the Chinese banking market. This implies that the large involuntary excess reserves may stimulate the rapid expansion of credit and the price bubble in the Chinese financial market. However, banks with larger involuntary excess reserves tend to reduce risk-taking more rapidly under the tightening monetary policy regime. The results provide support to Acharya and Naqvi's 3 (2012) argument that the central bank should follow a 'leaning against liquidity' approach, i.e. the central bank should adopt tightening monetary policy at times when banks are awash with liquidity to hold back banks' risk-taking incentive.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the risk-taking channel and develops the hypotheses of the study. Section 3 presents data used and methodology. Section 4 discusses the estimated results with additional analysis and robustness tests. Section 5 presents study summary and conclusions of the study.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Prior literature suggests that monetary policy has mixed effects on bank risk-taking. While banks' risk-taking is found to increase if the central bank reduces policy interest rates or keeps interest rate too low for too long (Gambacorta, 2009; De Nicolò et al., 2010; Gaggl and Valderrama, 2010; Angeloni et al., 2010; Delis and Brissimis, 2010; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Michalak, 2012) , other studies suggest that risk-taking decreases in response to the fall of monetary policy rates (De Graeve et al., 2008; Buch et al., 2011) . Nguyen and Boateng (2013) find that, in the presence of involuntary excess reserves, liquid banks and large banks tend to take greater risks, and hence, they become more vulnerable to monetary policy shocks in China. The following section discusses the hypotheses in respect of monetary policy, involuntary excess reserves and risk-taking behavior of Chinese banks which to the best of our knowledge no study has attempted to examine. Agenor et al. (2004) point out that, banks may voluntarily hold reserves above the statutory level (precautionary excess reserves) to buffer liquidity need. The involuntary excess reserves above the precautionary level deemed to be unwanted liquidity may stimulate aggressive lending Agenor et al., 2004; Nguyen and Boateng, 2013) . This argument is consistent with 4 the risk-taking theory which indicates that the surplus liquidity in the banking system leads to a perception of low probability of illiquidity risk among bank managers and consequently induces bank managers to take in more tail risk (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) . However, tail risk is the kind of risk that can be easily concealed and generates severe adverse consequences; but offers generous compensation the rest of the time (Rajan, 2006) . Low illiquidity risk makes the tail risk more easily to conceal, and therefore, the bank managers tend to take greater tail risk, relax lending standards and charge lending interest rate below the fundamental level to facilitate aggressively lending and increase remuneration which is often tied to credit volume (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) . In China, the banking organisation structure reforms in 1994 changed the managers' remuneration incentives from credit-plan adherence to loan revenue and credit default rate basis (Naughton, 1998; Allen et al., 2011) , and further reforms in 2002-2003 delegated lending decisions to loan managers and empowered them to set interest rates . The presence of involuntary excess reserves together with the volume-based remuneration is argued to induce risk-taking behaviour among Chinese bank managers. This argument leads to the first hypothesis that risk-taking has a positive relationship with involuntary excess reserves in the Chinese banking market.
Involuntary Excess Reserves and Risk-taking
H1: The risk-taking of Chinese banks has a positive relationship with involuntary excess reserves.
Monetary Policy, Involuntary Excess Reserves and Risk-taking
The expansionary monetary policy strengthens net-worth of banks (Bernanke et al., 1999) .
Under the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission, the strengthened net-worth improves banks' risk measurement, encourages banks to increase leverage and expand credit to borrowers whose risk measurement is also improved but business risk fundamentals remain unchanged, thus, banks' risk-taking tends to increase (Borio and Zhu, 2008; Adrian and Shin, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010) . Expansionary policy may also make banks search for yield (Rajan, 2006) or signal the central banks' policy stance on liquidity support if the market liquidity situation gets worse (Gambacorta, 2009; Altunbas et al., 2010) , and therefore, banks are induced to take greater risk. Drawing on this reasoning, tightening monetary policy is argued to weaken banks' net-worth, which in turn reduces risk-taking.
Prior studies suggest that Taylor-Gap can better capture the monetary policy stance (Altunbas et al., 2010; Gaggl and Valderrama, 2010; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011 and Michalak, 2012) .
Taylor-Gap is the difference between the actual monetary policy interest rate and the rate implied by Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) . According to Taylor's rule (Taylor, 1993) (Altunbas et al., 2010; Gaggl and Valderrama, 2010; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011 and Michalak, 2012) . The higher the Taylor-Gap, the more strongly the monetary policy is tightened. Similarly, the negative Taylor-Gap indicates the expansionary monetary policy. As tightening monetary policy is argued to discourage risk-taking, it is hypothesised that risk-taking has a negative relationship with Taylor-Gap.
H2: The risk-taking of Chinese banks has a negative relationship with Taylor-Gap.
Because expansionary monetary policy encourages risk-taking and involuntary excess reserves also induce risk-taking, it is further argued that banks with larger involuntary excess reserves take greater risk during the expansionary monetary policy regime. When the monetary policy is tightened, the net-worth of banks is adversely affected (Bernanke et al., 1999; Angeloni and Faia, 2009) , the tail risk is materialised and becomes less likely to be concealed (Rajan, 2006) 
Involuntary Excess Reserve Ratio (IERR) Measure
We adopt Agenor's et al. (2004) (2013), we model the demand for precautionary excess reserves and the estimation residual is collected as the involuntary excess reserves ratio.
where τ is a constant term, is a well-behaved error term and ( ) are lag polynomials, defined as:
LR , CASH and YR are defined by the following respective formulae:
Where:
, , and are interest income on loan, total customer deposit, vault cash and real GDP growth rate, respectively. is Hodrick-Prescott/Baxter-King filters.
is a ratio of excess reserves to deposits. is measured as the ratio of the difference between a bank's current account balance with the central bank and required reserve 3 over total customer deposit. Following Aikaeli (2011) and Nguyen and Boateng (2013) , loan return volatility ( ) is used to capture credit risk that may trigger deposit withdrawals, LR is measured as the absolute value of the deviation of loan interest income from its trend identified by the filter method developed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) . Loan interest income is the ratio of interest income on loan to total customer deposit. Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP) is a standard method for removing trend movements in the business cycle literature (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002) . As loan return volatility implies a bank's easy gain or loss, credit risk arises from both negative and positive deviations (Aikaeli, 2011) , hence, the absolute value of the deviation is taken into consideration.
CASH reflects cash-holding preference of depositors, measure by the volatility of the ratio of vault cash to total customer deposit by Hodrick-Prescott filter. YR is the ratio of real GDP growth rate to its trend (Hodrick-Prescott filter), capturing demand for cash. We also employ the filter developed by Baxter and King (1999) as an alternative method of measuring deviation. Moreover, RRR and R are the average reserve requirement ratio set by the People's Bank of China (PBC) within a certain year and the refinance interest rate, respectively; the latter term is the rate that the PBC charges when lending to financial institutions for short-term liquidity support (20-day call loan rate) and reflects the penalty cost if a bank falls short of the required amount of reserves. The model is estimated by System Generalised Method of Moments (SGMM) developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) ; Blundell and Bond (1998) . The optimal SGMM model is selected based on the criteria suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Roodman (2006) 
Monetary Policy Stance Index
Prior studies point out that the relationship between monetary policy and risk-taking may be endogenous because central banks tend to adjust monetary policy rate based on the observed risk-taking behaviour of commercial banks (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011) . We overcome this issue by two ways. First, we employ Generalised Method of Moments method (GMM) which provides efficient estimation with endogeneity problem (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . Second, Altunbas et al. (2010) , Gaggl and Valderrama (2010) , Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) and Michalak (2012) argue that the use of Taylor-Gap can make the endogeneity problem between monetary policy and risk taking less significant, we use Taylor-Gap to index the monetary policy stance. The Taylor-Gap is obtained from the residual of the Taylor-rule estimation.
The Taylor rule rate is algebraically expressed as below:
In which 
As argued by Fan et al. (2011) 
Regarding the policy interest rate in China, it is argued that Open Market Operation rate (OMO), which is the rate that PBC uses to sell or buy government bonds in the open market, does not necessarily signal monetary policy stance but is simply a sterilisation tool (Liu et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011) . Similarly, reserve requirement increases do not necessarily reflect tightening monetary policy but serve to tame excess liquidity in the Chinese banking system (Anderson, 2009 ). In addition, Green and Chang (2006) Fan et al. (2011) .
Definitions of Variables
To measure risk-taking, we use z-score developed by Boyd et al. (1993) . (2011) point out that z-score is a proper proxy for risk-taking because it is able to measure the distance from insolvency of banks. z-score combines profitability, leverage, and return volatility in a single measure (Berger et al., 2009) . It is argued that risk taking and credit risk do not refer to the same issue, and that z-score captures the risk taking incentive (i.e. overall risk) rather than credit risk because banks can offset the increase in credit risk by holding more capital (to reduce leverage) which in fact reduces their overall risk (Berger et al., 2009 ). Algebraically, z-score represents the probability of insolvency by reflecting the number of standard deviations that a bank's rate of return of assets has to fall for the bank to become insolvent.
where ROA is the return on assets, EA is the ratio of equity to total assets, and () ROA  is the standard deviation of ROA over a rolling window of 4-year period. As z-score is an 13 inverse proxy of the bank's total risk-taking or risk of default e.g. the smaller the z-score, the higher insolvency risk, we denote the risk-taking proxy (RISK) as the negative of z-score, i.e.
() RISK z score    , the higher the z-score, the lower the RISK and lower risk-taking.
To control for the risk arising from borrowers' weakened balance sheet (Bernanke et al., 1999) , we follow Altunbas et al. (2010) To obtain the involuntary excess reserve index (IER), the involuntary excess reserves ratio (IERR) is normalised using both the mean of the corresponding year and the mean of the sample as indicated in the formula 14. We denote IER1 and IER2 as involuntary excess reserves obtained from the normalization process with involuntary excess reserve ratios IERR1 and IERR2, respectively. To control for the bank lending channel (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Gambacorta, 2005) , we include bank-specific characteristics i.e. liquidity (LIQ), bank size (SIZE) and capitalisation (CAP) which are defined in line with the study of Gambacorta (2005) (14) where N and T are number of observations and number of years, respectively. Moreover, L denotes liquid assets as defined by BankScope, which includes cash, government bonds, short-term claims on other banks (including certificates of deposit), and, where appropriate the trading portfolio. C and A refer to equity (capital) and total assets, respectively. Table 1 
Econometric Model
System Generalised Method of Moments (SGMM) Model
Following the studies of Altunbas et al. (2010) , Tabak et al. (2010) , and Delis and Kouretas (2011) , the risk-taking is estimated by the following dynamic model: 
where is a constant term, is a well-behaved error term. RISK is measured as the negative of z-score. The interaction term × captures the impact of involuntary excess reserves on risk-taking in response to the monetary policy regime change. The
Chinese monetary policy is argued to be more enforceable to Chinese state-owned banks compared to non-state-owned banks (Geiger, 2008) . Prior studies also point out that foreign banks can seek for fund support from home banks and become less affected by monetary policy shock (Tabak et al., 2010; Ahtik, 2012) . We control for ownership effect by including OWNERSHIP dummy which has the value of 1 for state-owned banks, 2 for non-state-owned banks and 3 for foreign banks. YEAR is a time dummy variable.
Taking into account the relatively small sample period, only the first lag of dependent variable is considered, and this is in line with prior studies (see Altunbas et al., 2010; Tabak et al., 2010) . 'System' GMM (SGMM) estimator is use to estimate the model because ordinary least squares estimator (OLS) is biased in dynamic models. SGMM developed by Arellano and Bond's (1991) and further advanced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) provides consistent estimation in dynamic model with lags of dependent variable. Moreover, SGMM is efficient on unbalanced panel with high N/T ratio (where N is number of groups and T is time periods) (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2006) . In addition, SGMM also allow for fixed effect in the panel (Arellano and Bover, 1995) . SGMM is implemented by command xtabond2 on STATA package. Taylor-gap ( ) is considered as an endogenous variable. The interaction term, ownership and time dummies are treated as strictly exogenous variables, the others are treated as predetermined variables. The optimal model is selected based on the criteria suggested by (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and Roodman (2006 Roodman ( , 2009 in Appendix 1.
Monetary Policy Dummy Model
Altunbas et al. (2010), Gaggl and Valderrama (2010) , Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) and Michalak (2012) 
Main Estimations Results and Discussion
The two models are estimated by two alternative measures of involuntary excess reserves (i.e.
1 and 2) and two alternative monetary policy indexes (i.e. 1 and 2).
The estimations residuals are free of unit root and serial correlation. The results for SGMM and Monetary Policy Dummy estimations are reported in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. The three bank-specific characteristics -, and do not show any significant impacts on risk taking. Banks tend to take greater risk at higher stock index . Similarly, the expectation of higher future economic growth (Y) tends to induce banks to take greater risk.
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The involuntary excess reserves (IER) have a positive relationship with risk taking (RISK) as expected, supporting the hypothesis H1. The positive relationship is slightly significant for the SGMM estimations but becomes more significant in the Monetary Policy Dummy estimations. This result indicates that, banks with larger involuntary excess reserves tend to take greater risk. This evidence is in line with the theory that excess liquidity impact on the bank risk taking behaviour (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) . The positive relationship between involuntary excess reserves and risk taking may be resulted from the volume-based compensation policy in Chinese banks. In the presence of involuntary excess reserves, the illiquidity risk is considered to be low and bank managers appear to lend out aggressively to increase credit volume and compensation. Under the volume-based compensation policy, the liquidity surplus may induce the bank managers to aggressively lend out by relaxing lending standards, and therefore the banks take in greater risk (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) .
The impact of the monetary policy stance on risk taking is shown as follows: Note: 1. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Additional Analysis and Robustness Tests
It is argued that, the PBC sets loan limits mainly to the four state-owned banks to moderate credit supply (Geiger, 2008) , and the loan limits may restrain the risk taking behaviour of the state-owned banks. To overcome the loan limit effect and check the robustness of the study results, we exclude the four state-owned banks from the sample. The robust estimations show the similar results to the main estimations where the four state-owned banks are included.
Prior studies suggest that the change in Chinese accounting standards in 2008 may cause data inconsistency in financial statements reporting. To address this concern, Chow tests (see Chow, 1960 ) are employed to check for the model stability in two periods before and after
The Chow tests results show that there is no significant difference in the estimated
parameters between the two periods. We also control for the effect of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on financial statements reporting by including M&A dummy, the results are identical to the main estimations that exclude M&A dummy. Prior studies also suggest that city commercial banks and rural commercial banks tend to operate within a provincial scale rather than a national scale (Xu, 2011) , we control this effect by using expected provincial GDP growth for city commercial banks and rural commercial banks while the expected national GDP growth is used for other banks. The robustness results are similar to the main estimations where the expected national GDP growth is used for all banks. Beside the monetary policy stance index ( ), we also control for the revaluation effect of monetary policy shock on risk-taking (see Shin, 2009, 2010) by incorporating the change in one-year deposit benchmark rate and the change in the reserve requirement ratio which is used as a primary tool to sterilise excess liquidity in the banking system (Anderson, 2009 This evidence implies that tightening monetary policy can materialise the tail risk and make the tail risk no longer easy to be concealed, and therefore, the risk-taking incentive of the involuntary excess reserve is restrained.
Since 2003, the PBC has been using reserve requirement as a primary tool to reduce excess liquidity in the banking system (Anderson, 2009) , the finding of this study suggests that the PBC can also increase the policy benchmark rate to reduce the risk-taking behaviour driven by involuntary excess reserves. Although the evidence documented in this study appears 25 significant and contributes to under-researched topic, the sample size appears to be the limitation of the study. Further studies appear warranted if quarterly data becomes available to better capture the impact of monetary policy on risk-taking under in the text of large involuntary excess reserves in the Chinese banking system. option (Roodman, 2006) . Therefore, Sargan Test is not considered.
Hansen Source: Roodman, 2006; Roodman, 2009; Arelano and Bond, 1991 
